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ise to pay to their officers extra compensation in the way of a bonus, and when
properly authorized, it is not in itself a fraud upon dissenting stockholders.
Church v. Harnit, supra; Putnam v. Juvenile Shoe Corp., 307 Mo. 74, 269 S.W.
593 (1925) where the court said: "The payment of a bonus may be legal or
illegal, according to the purposes to which and the circumstances under which
the same is authorized ;" Witt v. James McNeil & Bro. Co., 296 Pa. 386, 146
Atl. 27 (1929). Generally, however, these schemes purporting to stimulate exec-
utive initiative by cash bonuses or rights to purchase stock at preferential prices
have received judicial sanction. Bennett v. Milville Improvement Co., 67 N.J.L.
320, 51 Atl. 706 (1902); Zwolanek v. Baker Mfg. Co., 150 Wis. 517, 137 N.W.
769 (1912); Young v. United States Mtg. & Trust Co., 214 N.Y. 279, 108 N.E.
418 (1915); Roberts v. Mills, 184 N.C. 406, 114 S.E. 530 (1922); Church v.
Hlzrnit, supra. And although bonuses are usually contingent on the amount of
profits, here the courts have upheld them as a cost of the enterprise rather than
a distribution of profits to other than stockholders. See Comment (1933) 42 Yale
Law Jour. 419, 422. Some courts have gone to the extent of attaching an eco-
nomic value to the bonus scheme. Booth v. Beattie, 95 N.J.Eq. 776, 118 Atl. 257
(1924) ; Harker v. Ralston Purina Co., 45 F. (2d) 929 (C.C.A. 7th, 1931). Their
economic value may be reasonably doubted, however, in view of the fact that
recent disclosures have indicated that these "bonus" plans may "mask raids on
corporate treasuries." See N. Y: Times, Feb. 22, 1933, at p. 1, re: National
City Bank of New York bonus plan; Time, Mar. 6, 1933, at p. 47; N. Y. Times,
Aug. 1, 1930, at p. 20, and id., Nov. 1, 1930, at p. 28, re: Bethlehem Steel Corp.
bonus system; Cox, COMPETITION IN THE AMERICAN TOBACCO INDUSTRY (1933) p.
308 et seq. A number of courts, however, have not hesitated to inquire into the
reasonableness of compensation received by corporate executives, even after
the approval of stockholders. Ward v. Davidson, 89 Mo. 445, 1 S.W. 846 (1886) ;
Lillard v. Oil Paint & Drug Co., 70 N.J.Eq. 197, 56 Atl. 254 (1903); Booth v.
Beattie, supra; Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 212 N.Y. 121, 105 N.E. 818
(1914); Atwater v. Elkhorn Valley Coal-Land Co., 184 App. Div. 253, 171 N.Y.
S. 552 (1918) ; Sotter v. Coatesville Boiler Works, 257 Pa. 411, 101 Atl. 744
(1917) ; Nichols v. Olympia Veneer Co., 139 Wash. 305, 246 Pac. 941 (1926) ;
Collins v. Hite, 109 W.Va. 79, 153 S.E. 240 (1930). Reasonableness, being the test
then, intervention is frequently placed on the theory enunciated by Judge Swan,
dissenting in Rogers v. Hill, 60 F. (2d) 109 (C.C.A. 2d, 1932), saying, that if
the payment is unreasonable, it constitutes a gift which the majority stockhold-
ers have no right to make against the protest of the minority. See also Godley v.
Crandall & Godley Co., supra; Collins v. Hite, supra. Other cases have justified
interference by a statement of the rule: "The fairness of such salaries is open
to examination in equity for the benefit of the corporation." See Rugg, C. J., in
Stratis v. Anderson, 254 Mass. 536, 150 N.E. 832 (1926). See also Booth v. Beat-
die, supra; Lowman v. Harvey R. Pierce Co., 276 Pa. 382, 120 At. 404 (1923);
Sotter v. Coatesville Boiler Works, supra.
CLEMENS H. ZEIDLER.
MASTER AND SERVANT-PAuPERs.-Proceedings for compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. The plaintiff received aid from the defendant
city pursuant to a statute requiring the municipality to relieve its poor, and con-
tinued to be so relieved without performing any labor for what he received until
the city instituted a scrip plan of relief under which able persons were "required"
to work. The rate of scrip pay was forty cents per hour. Plaintiff was assigned to
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work three hours a day at $7.20 per week, the scrip being exchangeable for sup-
plies at the city store. While working in a city park the plaintiff was injured.
Award of compensation made; on appeal. Held, award vacated. The contractual
relation of employer and employee did not exist. Vaivida v. City of Grand Rapids,
(Mich., 1933) 249 N.W. 826.
With thousands of men receiving emergency employment at the hands of
governmental units under arrangements, as in the instant case, novel to political
policy as well as to judicial review, the decision herein is especially pertinent.
To recover compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act the con-
tractual relation must exist between employer and employee. Mich. Comp. Laws
1929, par. 8407 et seq.; Sec. 102.07 (1), Wis. Stats.; Milw. T. Co. v. Indus. Coin-
mission, 203 Wis. 493, 234 N.W 748 (1931); Neitzsv. Kraft, 208 Wis. 301, 242
N.W. 163 (1932). The Michigan court vacated plaintiff's award on the ground
that he was "in a sense a ward of the municipality and if set to work at com-
mon and unremunerative public tasks there does not arise a contract of hire or
relation of employer and employee, but only a helping hand in behalf of the
1public charity." The court stated that the city possessed the common law right to
the services of its paupers-and that the relation here did not arise out of con-
tract but as a counterpart of their statutory duty to support.
In a dissent by three justices a more liberal handling is noted, for in this
opinion it was held that the scrip relief plan was not an incident to the admin-
istration of poor relief but a substitute for it, the employment of the plaintiff
being contractual and not statutory and that the situation created the relation of
employer-employee. The plainfiff was not required to work by statute nor the
city to provide work, both parties being free to contract for employment and
when, in pursuance of the city's plan, it had full control of the employment,
dictated the rates of wages and the hours and conditions of labor, it was in
no different position than any other employer making his own terms nor the
plaintiff from any other employee who accepts the terms offered. The relation-
ship created is governed by what they did, not by why they did it.
The case did not present an argument on the interpretation of precedent,
the newness of the question naturally precluding such help, and the few cases
cited were used only by way of suggestion in the dissenting opinion. The Wis-
consin court in Town of Germantown v. Industrial Caonmnission of- Wisconsin,
178 Wis. 642, 190 N.W. 448, 31 A.L.R. 1284 (1922), held that a taxpayer who
had an option to pay his road tax or perform labor and who chose to work,
created by his election an implied contract of service, and that the relationship
of employer-employee existed, stating that "the distinction between two kinds of
,workmen (for cash-or for tax) is too subtle and technical to be within the
spirit and purpose of the law." In the annotation of the case, 31 A.L.R. 1284,
citing also Winifield v. Peeden, 8 Kan. App. 671, 57 Pac. 131 (1899) and it re
Ashby, 60 Kan. 101, 55 Pac. 336 (1898), as cases holding similarly with the
Wisconsin decision, it is 'stated "the conclusion as to whether any particular
claimant's status oi relationship may be regarded as within the category or not
is likely to be influenced by the court's view of the spirit and purpose of the
act and its disposition to construe it broadly and liberally or narrowly and
strictly."
The Wisconsin court has many times stated that the provisions of the
'Workmen's Compensation Act should be as liberally construed to effect the
beneficent purposes intended as it can reasonably be. Metzger v. Koefler, 205
Wis. 339, 235 N.W. 802 (1931) ; Village of Kiel v. Industrial Comindssion, 163
Wis. 441, 158 N.W. 68 (1916); Rcnzing v. Industrial Commission, 185 Wis. 384,
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200 N.W. 652 (1925) ; (1933) 17 Marq. Law Rev. 188. Similar factual situations
are sure to reach the courts of many states in the near future and the instant
case will probably be much quoted, though a single precedent can mean but lit-
tle in the face of a liberal disposition in other courts. In Modin v. The City Land
Co., et al., (Minn., 1933), 250 N.W. 73 an award was given to a plaintiff working
under municipal unemployment relief; the question of relationship however was
not raised, the amount of compensation alone being at issue. It can hardly be
doubted that the social features of relief plans would be better served by hold-
ing the relation of a governmental agency to its working paupers to be that of
employer-employee.
CARL W. HOFMEISTER.
PuBLic UITmirs-REDUCTION OF RATES BY CoMMIssioN-ECoNOMIc CONDI-
TIONS.-Petition by the City of Wauwatosa for reduction of rates of the Wau-
watosa for reduction of rates of the Wauwatosa Gas Company on the grounds
that the rates were unlawful and unreasonable. Hearings held before the Wis-
consin Public Service Commission on Sept. 7, 1932, March 27, 1933, and July 19,
1933. Considerable testimony was introduced concerning economic conditions in
the Milwaukee area so as to show a large decrease in employment in 1932, a
decrease in average wages, and a large increase in the number of persons re-
ceiving outdoor relief. Evidence introduced in the investigation of the Wisconsin
Telephone Company, 2-U-35, P.U.R. 1933B, 412 reflecting on the economic con-
ditions in Wisconsin and Milwaukee was made a part of the record in this case.
During the same period of 1931 and 1932 the earnings of the Wauwatosa Gas
Company actually increased so as to net a return of 7.4 per cent on the com-
pany's rate base set at $884,000. Held, rates reduced so as to allow a return of
6 per cent instead of the return of 7.4 per cent presently enjoyed. City of Wau-
watosa v. Wanwwatosa Gas Company, 2-U-277, P.U.R. 1933D, 489 (1933).
The importance of this case lies in the fact that the Wisconsin Public Service
Commission has once again yielded to the pressure of economic conditions and
has ordered a temporary reduction of rates without first arriving at a final
determination of the rate base. Although the rate base was set at $884,000 the
Commission, itself, admits that its investigations were but preliminary and that
it had not as yet completed an audit of the company's books and a valuation of
the company's property. This case, therefore logically follows the rule laid
down in Re Wisconsin Telephone Company, P.U.R. 1932D, 173 (1932) in which
the Wisconsin Public Service Commission held that if an emergency justifies
temporary increases in utility rates without full investigation, as in Block v.
_Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458, 65 L. Ed. 865 (1921) ; Wilson v. New, 243
U.S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 61 L. Ed. 755 (1917) ; Chicago R. Co. v. Chicago, 292
Ill. 190, 126 N.E. 585 (1920) ; Omaha & C B. Street R. Co. v. State R. Co1mn.,
103 Neb. 695, 173 N.W. 690 (1919) ; then it may also justify a decrease in rates
for the same reason; that the Commission is given specific authority to reduce
rates in an emergency which affects the business or interests of the people, un-
der sec 196.70, Wis. Stats.; and that the economic depression is an emergency
within the meaning of the statute.
And yet there is an obvious distinction between this case and that of Re Wis-
consin Telephone Ccrmpany, supra. In the instant case the question of determin-
ing the rate base was not unusually difficult inasmuch as a comparatively small
investment of approximately one million dollars was involved. The Commission
took the company's own book value as being a fair investment of the rate base,
